讲座题目：Optimal Staging of Early Startups

讲座时间：2022年12月27日（星期二）中午12:00-13:30

讲座方式：腾讯会议ID：797-888-879

密码：221227

讲座链接：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/UbpGIorgyvpd

主 讲 人：

祁徐元达博士现任上海纽约大学金融学助理教授。他于罗切斯特大学商学院获得博士学位。他的研究方向是公司金融理论，他对包括风险投资、资本结构、机制设计和去中心化金融在内的多个领域，有着浓厚的研究兴趣。

讲座简介：

When early startups stage the financing of their capital investments, they are at risk of being severely diluted by venture capitalists later on. It is puzzling that early startups do so in a competitive financial market. This paper shows that staging is beneficial to an early startup with a small upside return and a high capital intensity of early development. In this case, absent staging, the entrepreneur gets a small number of shares, which provides him with weak incentives to increase the startup's value. If the financing is staged, reevaluation of the startup during the follow-on round incorporates all the nonverifiable information about interim performance. Staging provides additional incentives since the entrepreneur gets more shares when interim performance is better. Between round financing and tranched financing, the two most prevalent forms of staging, round financing generates stronger incentives for the entrepreneur, but a lower payoff to the venture capitalist, than tranched financing. As a result, with a smaller upside return and a higher capital intensity of early development, the venture capitalist is less likely to participate in round financing, and tranched financing is more likely to be used to ensure his participation. All the above results are robust in a mechanism design framework.